The article explores the extent to which criminal justice in Northern Ireland has been reconstructed over the past fifteen years. The focus is on the framework provided in the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the range of transition processes that followed. Post-Agreement Inquiries are reviewed and the findings demonstrate the institutional rigidities facing the transformation of criminal justice. While the ideologies and practices of counter-terrorism no longer dominate the business of criminal justice, the extent of change in terms of social representativeness, scale and expenditure is variable, with the prison service proving the least changed.
Introduction

Counter-terrorism as Industry
Until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the business of criminal justice in Northern Ireland was dominated by containing and countering violent political conflict. Vast resources were committed to this objective and a huge 'war economy' created. Policing, imprisonment and the courts were an integral part of this expansive security industry and have therefore faced major challenges during the transition to peace.
The purpose of this article is to review progress on the reconstruction of Northern Ireland's criminal justice institutions in the period following the Agreement, with a particular focus on barriers to change, the resourcing of change and the issue of social representation.
International experience demonstrates that if protracted conflicts are not to be repeated, complex and long-term processes of transformation are required across many spheres, including substantial reductions in conflictrelated industries and investment in social reconstruction (Collier et al. 2003; World Bank 2011) . Human rights abuses, before and during cycles of conflict, are key sources of dispute and often dominate the politics of peace processes. In the case of Northern Ireland, such 'legacy' issues have received considerable attention within the paradigm of 'transitional justice' There have been three main criticisms of the transitional justice paradigm. According to McEvoy (2007: 425) , it has been dominated by lawyers and forms of legalism that 'disconnect individuals and communities from any sense of sovereignty' over the issues involved. Secondly, Brewer (2010: 37, 206-7) criticizes the 'good governance' approach to peacecomprising 'democratic political institutions, market economies and human rights law' -for ignoring the importance of 'sociological issues that are equally critical to the success of the transition process'. The restoration of social bonds through 'hoping, forgiving, apologising, remembrance', truth recovery and healing, is essential in strengthening fragile peace processes. A third criticism invokes a broader notion of sociological concerns, focusing on the social needs and interests of those communities most affected by violent conflict. As Greiff and Duthie (2009) argue, the transitional justice approach tends to ignore the claims of social justice arising from the economic roots and consequences of conflict. Post-conflict economic development is often based on policies of economic liberalisation to the detriment of equality, social inclusion and cohesion (Hillyard et al. 2005; Oslen et al. 2010) . In the Northern Ireland case, the question of resourcing transition has become more acute in the wake of austerity state budgeting and the devolution of justice achieved in April 2010 (Tomlinson and Kelly 2011) .
The analysis below is informed by Christie's (1993) perspective on 'crime control as industry'. As with crime, a specialist global counter-terrorism industry has developed based on similar imperatives of social and political polarisation. Counter-terrorism is propelled by 'an urge for expansion (which) is built into industrial thinking ' (1993: 13) . It has also become 'normalised' in law, with attendant social and political effects (Sim and Thomas 1983; Hillyard 1993; Mathiesen 2002) . For the Northern Ireland conflict, the early 1990s may be regarded as the 'high-point' of criminal-justice-as-counterterrorism in terms of the scale of resources involved, and a low-point in terms of legitimacy. There was little agreement at Westminster on the causes of conflict, how to police it effectively and how to move forward politically, especially on the sensitive issue of talking to terrorists.
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In the quest for the total elimination of terrorism the Government had almost doubled Northern Ireland's security expenditure (in real terms) in the ten years from 1984, adopting a 'blank cheque' mentality to the war on terrorism. Few had ever considered the costs of the conflict in financial terms or analysed the impact on the economy and labour market. According to Tony Benn, however, 'the cost of the war has been £14.5 billion' (HC Debate 1993, 230, col. 515) . Arguably, a more realistic total was £23.5 billion, with annual costs running to £2.3 billion by 1993/4, and 42 per cent of the costs arising in Britain and the Republic of Ireland (Tomlinson, 1994: 25-32 By the early 1990s, more than 38,000 people were directly employed in policing, running the prisons and in the Ulster Defence Regiment. This was a segregated labour force -mainly male and Protestant -in a heavily segmented Northern Irish labour market (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988) . The prospect of armed republicanism leaving the stage as part of a peace process represented a huge threat to the security industry. This is why the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Jim Molyneaux, saw the IRA's 1994 ceasefire as 'destabilising' and the worst thing that had ever happened to unionists (McKittrick 1999) . There were good reasons not to trust the old enemy, to seek out opportunities to re-create it, and to resist the potential transformation of Northern Ireland's criminal justice agencies.
Criminal Justice in Transition
The 1998 (Bloomfield Report 1998: 8) . While the Commission's work mainly focused on the psychological needs of victims, it also made recommendations on how reconciliation between the communities might be achieved. The demands for 'truth and justice' in relation to state killings and collusion between intelligence agencies, security forces and Loyalist armed groups was mentioned briefly, but no recommendation was made as to whether or how this issue should be addressed (Bell 2003 (Bell : 1103 . Pat Finucane represented a number of high profile republicans, including hunger striker Bobby Sands MP, and his clients were often told by RUC interrogators that their solicitor was targeted. Nelson and Finucane were not unusual in this respect. RUC threats against lawyers involved in criminal cases were common in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these lawyers were apparently resented for being successful Catholics, were assumed to be 'fellow-travellers' of their paramilitary clients and were subject to speculation that their high earnings from legal aid were financing terrorist causes (Murphy 2000 (Murphy : 1889 It is clear from the above that the intelligence-led policing practices which allowed people to commit murder with impunity remain a significant source of political contention. As such they present barriers to the building of confidence in the PSNI and the implementation of the policing principles articulated in the Agreement and the Patten Report: representative bodies serving communities by preventing crime and solving problems within a framework of accountability and human rights.
The Costs of Transition
The piecemeal nature of the transitional processes reviewed above owes much to the lack of political agreement over the causes of the violent conflict and the reasons why it endured so long. While there is no 'transitional justice budget' as such, it is possible to identify most of the major costs of transitional processes (Table 1 ). It should be pointed out that Table 1 Table 1 shows that over £440 million has been spent on recent transitional justice process in the North and €68 million in the South to date. Northern Ireland will invigorate public debate on the fundamental purpose and value of criminal justice remains to be seen.
